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Hungdah Chiu, China, and International Law:  






Chinese and Americans share many things. One of the things we 
share is a belief in turning a vice into a virtue. This program does 
that. We have come here to pay a sad tribute to the late Professor 
Chiu Hungdah, yet, we will benefit from the impressive program that 
has been organized to celebrate Professor Chiu‘s memory.  
My informal introduction to the program can be divided into 
three parts. First, I will talk about Professor Chiu, whom I knew very 
well early in his career and whose subsequent achievements I 
continue to admire. Second, I will discuss the changes in China‘s 
attitude toward international law since the time he and I completed 
the book People’s China and International Law: A Documentary 
Study.1 And third, I will make a few remarks about China and 
international law today. This might constitute a transition to the 
important program that follows. 
I.  SOME PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF PROFESSOR CHIU 
Let me go back to August 1964, when I joined the Harvard Law 
School faculty. I left Berkeley‘s Boalt Hall for Cambridge with 
considerable reluctance, but for good reasons. There were great 
members of the Harvard law faculty whom I knew I could learn from, 
such as Richard Baxter and Louis Sohn in international law, Harold 
 
† Jerome A. Cohen is professor of law and co-director of the U.S.-Asia Law Institute at New 
York University School of Law. He is also adjunct senior fellow for Asia at the Council on 
Foreign Relations. He formerly served as associate dean for international, comparative and 
graduate studies, Jeremiah Smith Jr. Professor and director of East Asian Legal Studies at 
Harvard Law School. The following is an edited version of the author‘s remarks delivered as 
part of China, Taiwan, and International Law: A Symposium in Honor of Professor 
Hungdah Chiu on October 5, 2011 at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School 
of Law. 
 1. JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE‘S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
A DOCUMENTARY STUDY (1974).  
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Berman in Soviet law, Lon Fuller in jurisprudence, and Paul Freund 
in constitutional law. I was also attracted to Harvard‘s China 
scholars: the historians John Fairbank and Benjamin Schwartz, the 
sociologist Ezra Vogel, the economist Dwight Perkins, and others.  
I did not know I would find Hungdah at Harvard. He had come 
from Taiwan to do an S.J.D., a doctorate in law. I was lucky—there 
he was. By the mid-1960s, it was clear that international law would 
become critical in China‘s relations with the world, and in U.S.-
China relations, so I wanted to pursue that subject. I was not very up-
to-date on international law, but I had studied it at Yale Law School 
with Myres McDougal, a major figure in the field.2 After my 
graduation in 1955, however, I focused for over a decade on 
questions of criminal justice, both American and, eventually, 
Chinese. 
I had to catch up in order to pursue China and international law, 
and Hungdah was the perfect mentor. He was a genuine specialist. He 
was encyclopedic in his knowledge of universal or ―Western‖ 
international law. He also, of course, was familiar with the record of 
the Republic of China (ROC) since its establishment in 1912 and 
after its removal to Taiwan in 1949. Moreover, he knew a huge 
amount about the People‘s Republic of China (PRC), which was then 
often referred to as ―Red China.‖ He had a host of materials at his 
fingertips.3  
So we started to work together, and for me it was a very 
satisfying relationship. It was also successful. In 1974, our book, 
People’s China and International Law,4 finally came out after many 
years of hard labor. It won a prize from the American Society of 
International Law as the best documentary study in the field in the 
preceding two years.5 Especially among political scientists, it had a 
 
 2. See, e.g., Dona A. Hathaway, The Continuing Influence of the New Haven School, 32 
YALE J. INT‘L L. 553, 553 (2007) (discussing the ―deep and abiding influence‖ of the New 
Haven School of International Law); Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law’s Empire: The 
Jurisprudence of War, 85 AM. J. INT‘L L. 117, 117 (1991) (describing McDougal as a 
―seminal figure,‖ especially with regard to the New Haven School of International Law). 
 3. For more information about Professor Chiu‘s materials, see The Papers of Professor 
Hungdah Chiu, Thurgood Marshall Law Library, the University of Maryland Francis King 
Carey School of Law. 
 4. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1. 
 5. Past ASIL Award Winners and Honorees, AM. SOC‘Y OF INT‘L LAW, www.asil.org/ 
awardarchives.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
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good reception.6 We were a little disappointed that very few 
specialists reviewed it for the law journals, but one problem in 
establishing a new subject is that there are not many people who want 
to critique something they don‘t know much about.7 Later, when 
professional contacts with China became possible, we discovered that 
our book made an impact on the Mainland, as well as in Taiwan.  
Although the book came out in 1974, it wasn‘t until 1979 that I 
had an opportunity, when at last living in Beijing, to exchange ideas 
with some of China‘s experts in international law. I remember 
meeting Professor Chen Tiqiang, who received a Ph.D. from the 
University of London before ―Liberation‖ in 1949, and became well 
known among PRC scholars of international law in the new regime‘s 
early years. Like many of his colleagues, however, he had a hard time 
during the twenty years between the ―anti-rightist‖ movement of 
1957 to 1958 and the ascent of Deng Xiaoping in 1978. When we 
first chatted, Professor Chen said, ―we have never met before, but 
because of your book, I feel we‘re old friends.‖ That moved me. And, 
of course, Hungdah later became friendly with, and respected by, 
many scholars of international law in China.  
Professor James Li reminded me that eleven years ago in New 
York we had a program for the city bar association about Taiwan and 
international law. Professors Li, Chiu, and Chen Lung-Chu from 
Taiwan were the panelists, respectively representing three different 
viewpoints in what turned out to be a lively, extremely informative 
evening. Despite the controversial topic, from my perch as moderator 
 
 6. Gene T. Hsiao, People’s China and International Law: A Documentary Study, 61 
CHINA Q. 161, 161 (1975) (book review); James Chieh Hsiung, People’s China and 
International Law: A Documentary Study, 34 J. ASIAN STUD. 528 (1975) (book review); 
Alan P. L. Liu, People’s China and International Law: A Documentary Study, 418 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 166 (1975) (book review); Douglas M. Johnston, People’s 
China and International Law: A Documentary Study, 50 PAC. AFF. 504 (1977) (book 
review); James Townsend, People’s China and International Law: A Documentary Study, 96 
J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC. 448 (1976) (book review). An advertisement for People’s China in the 
Harvard Law Review quoted China expert Alan S. Whiting‘s review in the Asian Student:  
This is a superb survey of the perception and practice of international law as 
manifested in the writing and behavior emanating from the People‘s Republic 
of China down to 1973 . . . . a model of documentary compilation and 
commentary that is indispensable for an understanding of Chinese foreign 
policy. 
88 Harv. L. Rev., no. 6, 1975, at viii.  
 7. But see George Ginsburgs, People’s China and International Law, 22 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 575 (1974) (book review); Shao-Chuan Leng, People’s China and International Law: A 
Documentary Study, 69 AM. J. INT‘L L. 206 (1974) (book review).  
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I could see that Hungdah was very comfortable exchanging ideas 
with experts from the Mainland, as well as the Taiwan independence 
movement. 
Hungdah had many accomplishments. He was a man who lived 
an open, yet double, life in an unusual sense. He was so productive in 
scholarship in two languages that one might think that he wrote 
English articles with his right hand and Chinese articles with his left 
hand. I am very happy that we now have a volume collecting a lot of 
his Chinese language op-eds and other shorter pieces.8 And, of 
course, I very much appreciated President Ma Ying-Jeou‘s April 24 
tribute,9 in which he refers to his former teacher‘s monumental 
Chinese language study, Modern International Law.10 That book also 
enhanced Professor Chiu‘s reputation on the Mainland, which has 
long noted the academic work done in Taiwan in many fields, 
including domestic and international law. 
In addition to the book we did together, Hungdah contributed to 
a number of other English language works. One important essay was 
The Development of Chinese International Law Terms and the 
Problem of Their Translation into English.11 It was a very interesting 
article, which showed the absorption of Western international law 
terms into the Chinese and Japanese languages and the problems of 
rendering concepts from a very different legal culture into East Asian 
languages.12 That paper is still worth studying today. He did another 
very interesting essay, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist 
Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties, where he compared the treaty 
practice of the PRC and the ROC.13 It was one of the early studies 
demonstrating how similar the positions of the two contending 
Chinese governments have been with respect to many, but not all, 
 
 8. See generally GUOJIFA LUNJI (國際法論集) [COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ARTICLES (IN HONOR OF THE SIXTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY OF PROFESSOR HUNGDAH CHIU)] (2011). 
 9. Ma Ying-Jeou, Tribute in Memory of Dr. Hungdah Chiu, 27 MD. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2012).  
 10. HUNGDAH CHIU (丘宏達), XIAN DAI GUO JI FA (現代國際法) [MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] (1995). 
 11. Hungdah Chiu, The Development of Chinese International Law Terms and the 
Problem of Their Translation into English, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH 
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 139 (Jerome Alan Cohen ed., 1970). 
 12. See generally id. 
 13. Hungdah Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of 
Unequal Treaties, in CHINA‘S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 239 
(Jerome Alan Cohen ed., 1972). 
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international law questions.14 Today one of the more important 
aspects of scholarly work on Chinese law, both domestic and 
international, is to continue that comparative effort. Many Western 
China specialists neglect the record of Taiwan‘s legal achievements, 
and it is a loss to our scholarship if we do not cure that. Hungdah led 
us in the right direction. 
Hungdah surprised me in 1985 when he came out with an 
English language book co-authored with Professor Leng Shao-Chuan, 
an able political scientist at the University of Virginia.15 It was not on 
international law, but on criminal justice in China. Of course, a 
country‘s domestic criminal justice system has an intimate 
relationship to many international legal questions, especially human 
rights and the protection of aliens, but the book‘s coverage was 
broader than that and it was very good. 
There were other aspects, perhaps lesser known, about Hungdah. 
He was a talent scout. Some younger people who affiliate with an 
older scholar often want to become the senior person‘s exclusive 
fount of advice; they sometimes feel the need to elbow other people 
out of the way, so they can be the source. Hungdah wasn‘t like that. 
He was very open, welcoming, and helpful to others. One thing we 
shared was an interest in adding new players to a new field, 
expanding our collective capacity to learn more.  
He was constantly introducing me to people. His classmate at 
National Taiwan University, Chang Wejen, who did an LL.M. at 
Southern Methodist University and went on to Yale, was especially 
interesting to me. Like so many of the best students from Taiwan of 
that era, he was studying guoji gongfa, public international law. Of 
course, I had gone to Yale Law School and studied the same thing, 
and was actively researching the subject, but I thought that not every 
law graduate in Taiwan or China who went abroad should study 
international law, since there are many other academic needs. I noted 
that whenever Hungdah talked about his friend Wejen, he always said 
the same thing: ―His Chinese is really good.‖ To an American ear, 
that sounded curious. 
 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 267 (―While both the Nationalist and the Communist Chinese 
denounce those treaties imposed upon China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as 
unequal treaties, their concepts of unequal treaties differ.‖). 
 15. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA: 
ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS (1985). 
4-COHEN MACRO (MJIL reviewed) (AUTHOR reviewed DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2012 10:10 AM 
14 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 27:9 
Dean Haddon, for example, is an eloquent person. I might say 
that she is articulate, or a very good speaker, but I would not say ―her 
English is really good.‖ So, finally, I asked Hungdah, ―What do you 
mean when you say Chang‘s Chinese is really good?‖ He said, ―It‘s 
very simple; he has had a classical Chinese education. He did not go 
to school like the rest of us. He had tutors his family brought to the 
house; he can read the ancient legal script.‖ I was already quite 
interested in comparative legal history. I had tried at Harvard to 
support promising young scholars in Anglo-American legal history, 
in order to create a new generation of law teachers who might make 
legal history a more popular American law school course than it was. 
I also wanted to see work done in Chinese legal history, which was 
obviously important, but too little explored in both Chinese and 
Western publications. I asked Hungdah, ―Why don‘t you get this 
fellow up here from Yale, so we can try to brainwash him?‖ Sure 
enough, Chang Wejen came up, and we persuaded him to grasp the 
opportunity to be a pioneer in his generation, and go into China‘s 
legal history. He is still at it, and has become one of the world‘s 
leading experts in this increasingly recognized field, teaching and 
writing at many Mainland law schools, as well as in Taiwan.16 He 
and I have done a few Chinese language dialogues at Peking 
University and Tsinghua University in recent years, in an effort to 
show students why history is relevant to contemporary China‘s legal 
system and a better understanding of comparative law generally.17 
Hungdah introduced me to a stream of others who have made major 
contributions to law and life. Taiwan‘s President Ma Ying-Jeou was 
one of the prizes he brought to Harvard, then C.V. Chen and Nigel 
Li, two of Taiwan‘s most outstanding lawyers today, and others. 
Since I was chairing the law school‘s graduate program, I should 
have put Hungdah on commission because he was such a good talent 
scout.  
 
 16. Chang Wejen has taught at National Taiwan University, Tsinghua University, Peking 
University, UCLA, Harvard, and NYU, among other universities. See FY Chang Annual 
Lectures (1998–2011), US-CHINA EDUC. TRUST, http://uscet.net/template/page.cfm? 
menu_id=225 (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Global Faculty, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/global/globalfacultyandcourses/previousglobalfaculty/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012) (providing a brief biography). His major research post has been 
at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. 
 17. The Annual F.Y. Chang Lecture brings scholars and jurists to Peking University Law 
School and Tsinghhua University Law School to discuss various topics related to law in 
China. FY Chang Annual Lectures (1998-2011), US-CHINA EDUC. TRUST, 
http://uscet.net/template/page.cfm?menu_id=225 (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). I have been 
participating since 2002, and Chang Wejen has been participating since 1999. Id. 
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He played a similarly important role in guiding young people 
who studied at other institutions, whether in Taiwan or America. I 
was in Taipei when I learned the news of Hungdah‘s death, and was 
amazed how many people there told me the impact he had on them. 
During Hungdah‘s last years, every time I visited President Ma, the 
President showed genuine concern about his mentor‘s illness. The 
statement he issued at Hungdah‘s passing reflected a great deal of 
thought and feeling.18 
One other aspect of Hungdah that I admired was his objectivity. 
We were working in a contentious era. We started in 1966, just as the 
Cultural Revolution broke out.19 We completed the book on July 1, 
1973, my birthday, and that of the Chinese Communist Party!20 This 
was a time of momentous transition in United States–China–Taiwan 
relations, and particularly a period of maximum anxiety for Taiwan. 
This was the time of Henry Kissinger‘s famous 1971 secret trip to 
Beijing, which was followed in 1972 by President Nixon‘s decidedly 
un-secret trip.21 Nixon generated the world‘s biggest ballyhoo over it, 
assuring his re-election.  
In our collaboration, Hungdah and I had to describe and analyze 
many controversial questions. For example, should the United States 
recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the People‘s 
Republic, abandoning the ROC and Chiang Kai-shek, our ally since 
World War II?22 Chiang was still trying to convince the American 
people that the Republic of China was ―free China,‖ supposedly a 
democratic government in contrast to the ―people‘s democratic 
dictatorship‖ on the Mainland.23 Of course, Chiang‘s propaganda was 
 
 18. Ma Ying-Jeou, supra note 9.  
 19. See Jerome Alan Cohen, Interviewing Chinese Refugees: Indispensable Aid to Legal 
Research on China, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND 
PERSPECTIVES 84, 84–85 (Jerome Alan Cohen ed., 1970) (discussing the general difficulties 
conducting research on ―Chinese Communist law‖).  
 20. Edward Wong, By-the-Book Celebration For China’s Communists on Party’s 90th 
Birthday, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2011, at A6 (describing the 2011 Anniversary in Beijing). 
 21. See generally Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger 
Go to China, 92 J. AM. HIST. 109 (2005) (detailing Kissinger‘s and Nixon‘s trips to China). 
 22. See RICHARD C. BUSH, UNTYING THE KNOT: MAKING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT 
110 (2005) (discussing the tension among the PRC, ROC, and the United States).  
 23. See, e.g., Tay-sheng Wang & I-Hsun Sandy Chou, The Emergence of Modern 
Constitutional Culture in Taiwan, 5 NAT‘L TAIWAN U.L. REV. 1, 17 (2010) (―It was 
important to [Chiang Kai-shek to] have the appearance of a democratic and liberal 
government because the government in Taiwan represented the free China in contrast to the 
Communist regime in Mainland China; this was especially important to receive support from 
the U.S. government.‖). 
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nonsense.24 But many Americans believed it, and there was a big 
political division in our country over China policy.25 There was also 
the long-standing question about Beijing‘s entry into the United 
Nations, which finally occurred in October 1971.26 Our book had to 
deal with these issues and many other prickly ones, but I never got 
the feeling that Hungdah was anything but a professional. We 
differed on these issues. He supported Chiang‘s Republic of China 
government. I did not, but we never had one difficulty with politics. 
He was totally objective, and I was very impressed. 
I should also say that I admired his political activism. He was not 
an ―ivory-tower‖ scholar insulated from public affairs. He sometimes 
served as a distinguished government official in Taiwan, and, when 
the time came for the normalization of diplomatic relations between 
Washington and Beijing in 1979, he played a role in persuading 
America to adopt the Taiwan Relations Act.27 That act continues to 
protect the island to this day. Additionally, his skill in international 
law helped his government preserve its fabled ―Twin Oaks‖ 
ambassadorial residence in Washington, against PRC demands to 
succeed to the property as the newly-recognized government of 
China.28  
II. CHINA‘S CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Let me now turn to the second part of my remarks—changes 
with respect to China‘s theory and practice of international law since 
Hungdah and I started our cooperation in 1966. As I said, that was 
 
 24. See id. at 16 (―No Taiwanese dared to question the authority of Chiang Kai-shek for 
fear of execution, persecution and imprisonment.‖). 
 25. See, e.g., TANG TSOU, AMERICA‘S FAILURE IN CHINA, 1941–50, at 447–54 (1963) 
(describing the fault lines between the Truman administration and Republican critics of 
China policy). 
 26. See Tucker, supra note 21, at 120. 
 27. See Hungdah Chiu, Taiwan Relations Act, in MODERN CHINA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
HISTORY, CULTURE, AND NATIONALISM 345–46 (Wang Ke-wen ed., 1998) (explaining the 
Taiwan Relations Act). 
 28. See Pasha L. Hsieh, An Unrecognized State in Foreign and International Courts: The 
Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 765, 776 (2007). In order to 
avoid ―Twin Oaks‖ from being transferred to the PRC under the principle of automatic ―state 
succession,‖ the ROC sold the property to a pro-Taiwan organization called the Friends of 
Free China. Id. According to author Hsieh, the Taiwan Relations Act in turn ―prevented the 
invalidation of this transfer by declaring that the absence of recognition of [Taiwan] does not 
affect property interests ‗heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.‘‖ Id. 
at 776–77 (quoting Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b)(3)(A) (2000)). In 1982, the 
Friends of Free China transferred the Twin Oaks property back to the ROC. Id. at 777 n.58.  
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just when the Cultural Revolution began.29 It was an unthinkable 
development, of which we only gradually became aware.  
Yet the PRC had demonstrated a revolutionary outlook toward 
the international community from the time of its establishment in 
1949.30 If the United States had recognized and established 
diplomatic relations with the PRC from the outset of the communist 
regime, we might have moderated its hostility. For our own domestic 
political reasons, however, we did not. The United States also 
opposed the PRC‘s entry into the United Nations under any 
formula.31 Thus, the United Nations rejected the PRC as the lawful 
representative of the Chinese people, despite its control of the 
Mainland.32 The government of the ROC held onto the Chinese seat 
in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, even though 
it lost the civil war.33 Moreover, immediately after the United Nations 
rejected the PRC, when the United States decided to pursue the 
retreating North Korean forces into North Korea and possibly 
eliminate the buffer state on China‘s border, the entry of ―Chinese 
People‘s Volunteers‖ into the Korean conflict served to enhance the 
PRC‘s revolutionary rhetoric against the existing world 
organization.34 The United Nations, not only the United States, 
became China‘s enemy in Korea.35  
 Although the end of the Korean conflict in 1953 led to a milder, 
more flexible emphasis on ―peaceful coexistence‖ in Chinese foreign 
policy during the mid-1950s,36 Chairman Mao did not abandon the 
 
 29. See, e.g., Craig Dietrich, Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, in MODERN CHINA: 
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, CULTURE, AND NATIONALISM, supra note 27, at 126–27. 
 30. See COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1, at 18–19 (discussing the establishment of the PRC 
and the PRC‘s early foreign policy). 
 31. See, e.g., Lyushun Shen, The Taiwan Issue in Peking’s Foreign Relations in the 
1970s: A Systematic Review, 1 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B INT‘L L. & AFF. 74, 84 (1981) (―[T]he 
United States had continually made annual efforts in the U.N., first relying on moratorium 
tactics and later on the ―important question‖ procedure, to preempt any substantive 
resolution aimed at offering the China seat to the PRC at the expense of the ROC.‖). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Hsieh, supra note 28, at 769. 
 34. See, e.g., Weng Ke-Wen, Resist America and Assist Korea Campaign (kangMei 
yuanChao), in MODERN CHINA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, CULTURE, AND 
NATIONALISM, supra note 27, at 284–84.  
 35. Id. 
 36. China‘s five principles of peaceful coexistence with other countries included mutual 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-
interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Shi-
ping Zheng, Bandung Conference, in MODERN CHINA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, 
CULTURE, AND NATIONALISM, supra note 27, at 22. 
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hope of establishing an international organization of developing 
countries that might rival the United Nations.37 China‘s distrust of the 
Western-controlled United Nations was matched by its distrust of the 
international law reflected in UN practice.38 In that era, PRC views of 
international law were shaped by the Soviet Union‘s experts, just as 
China‘s domestic legal developments followed the Soviet legal model 
until the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s and the radicalization of 
the PRC‘s domestic legal system.39 
The most distinctive of the theories of international law imported 
from the Soviet Union stated that there were really three types of 
international law.40 There was the bourgeois view of international 
law, to regulate relations among bourgeois states, there was the 
international law to govern relations between the socialist world and 
the bourgeois world, and then, there was socialist international law, 
to govern relations among the socialist states.41 
The era of Soviet influence soon passed, and, beginning with the 
―anti-rightist‖ movement of 1957 to 1958 and the ―Great Leap 
Forward‖ campaign that followed it, China entered a domestically 
more revolutionary situation.42 Harsh repression of Chinese 
intellectuals and destruction of China‘s budding Soviet-style 
domestic legal system were accompanied by vicious political attacks 
on the country‘s main specialists in international law, who had been 
trained in pre-Liberation days but had adapted to the Soviet era.43 
When the ―Cultural Revolution‖ began in 1966, there was no basis 
 
 37. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1, at 1294–97. 
 38. See Michael Bennett, The People’s Republic of China and the Use of International 
Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute, 28 STANFORD J. INT‘L L. 425, 443 (1992) (―[T]he 
representation of China at the United Nations by the government of Taiwan . . . intensified 
the PRC‘s dissatisfaction with the international legal order.‖). 
 39. For the convolutions of China‘s domestic legal system in that era, see JEROME ALAN 
COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949–1963: AN 
INTRODUCTION 9–17 (1968). 
 40. See Hungdah Chiu, Communist China’s Attitude Towards International Law, 60 AM. 
J. INT‘L L. 245, 256 (1966) (discussing the different views of international law in China at 
that time). 
 41. Id. In 1957, Professor Chiu Jih-ch‘ing explained international law in a similar 
manner, but stated that there were only two systems, general and socialist. BYRON N. TZOU, 
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE BOUNDARY DISPUTES 8 (1990).  
 42. He Gaochao, Mao Zedong, in MODERN CHINA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, 
CULTURE, AND NATIONALISM, supra note 27, at 201–02 (describing the anti-rightist 
movement and the ―Great Leap Forward‖). 
 43. See Ranbir Vohra, Hundred Flowers Campaign, in MODERN CHINA: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, CULTURE, AND NATIONALISM, supra note 27, at 150 (discussing 
the transition from the Hundred Flowers Campaign to the Anti-Rightist Movement, 
denouncing intellectuals). See also COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1, at 15. 
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for hope that the PRC would adopt universal standards of 
international law and join the world community in the near future. 
Certainly, China‘s leaders had good reasons to be cynical about 
American assertions of international law. During the PRC‘s first 
decade, the United States took many illegitimate, covert actions 
against China in an effort to undermine the new regime.44 For 
example, it flew non-communist Chinese and American CIA agents 
into China to help organize unrest.45 Also, after training expatriate 
Tibetans in mountain warfare in Colorado, it dropped them back into 
their homeland to stoke the fires of resistance.46 
I personally saw this up close in my senior year at Yale College 
before I went to law school. In February 1951 the Korean War was 
going badly for the United States. We college students did not know 
what our future would be upon graduation. One day a sign went up 
on the employment bulletin board: the CIA will be here next week to 
interview graduating seniors, just like Proctor & Gamble or IBM. Of 
course, we did not know what ―the Agency‖ wanted. About thirty of 
us went to an introductory meeting in order to find out, but its 
representative was extremely vague in his remarks. Finally, I said to 
him, in front of the group, ―Can‘t you at least give us a hypothetical 
to illustrate what kind of job we might fill? What kind of work are 
you talking about?‖ I was a political science major in international 
relations and I was looking for a desk job in Washington as an 
intelligence analyst. The CIA recruiter was very annoyed when I 
pressed him for an example. Finally, he said, ―O.K., I‘ll give you a 
hypothetical, but mark you, it is purely hypothetical.‖ He then said, 
―We might want to train you and drop you into China to help 
organize resistance against the new regime.‖ My jaw must have 
fallen, and I said. ―Gosh, that sounds awfully dangerous.‖ At that, he 
became indignant and said, ―During the last war, (World War II), we 
(meaning the O.S.S., the predecessor of the CIA) had fewer casualties 
than the infantry.‖ To which I said, ―Do you mean on an absolute or 
relative basis?‖ He replied, ―I don‘t think you‘re seriously 
interested.‖ I said, ―You‘re right,‖ and walked out.  
 
 44. See Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Towards International Law—and Our Own, 
Proc. AM. SOC. INT‘L L. 108, 110–111, 114–15 (1967); Matthew Aid & Jeffrey T. Richelson, 
U.S. and China: Collection, Analysis, and Covert Action, DIGITAL NATIONAL SECURITY 
ARCHIVE, 1 (Mar. 4, 2012), http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/collections/content/CI/ 
intell_and_china_essay.pdf (discussing covert actions in China after the Communist Party 
took over on October 1, 1949). 
 45. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1, at 625–28. 
 46. Aid & Richelson, supra note 44, at 30.  
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Later I heard that at least twelve of my classmates were 
interested, but six were rejected as insufficiently rugged. One who 
was not rejected was John T. Downey Jr., a 195-pound tackle on the 
Yale football team and captain of the wrestling team. Seventeen 
months after our graduation, his plane was shot down over China, 
trying to pick up non-Communist Chinese agents whom the CIA had 
dropped there.47 I later spent seven years, at the request of our 
classmates at our
 
fifteenth college reunion in 1966, working to get 
Jack Downey out of prison, and if you look at the book that Professor 
Chiu and I did together, you will see material on the Downey case.48 
So I knew firsthand what the United States was up to, and I can 
forgive the Chinese government‘s cynicism about our government‘s 
frequent concealment and manipulation of the facts, and its lying 
about the Downey case and others. For two years, China was silent 
about Downey‘s capture and the United States was silent about his 
mysterious disappearance. We all thought he had been killed—his 
mother had been told he was missing in action. In November 1954, 
however, the military tribunal of the Supreme People‘s Court in 
Beijing announced he had just been put on trial with some 
colleagues.49 They had all been found guilty, and Downey had been 
sentenced to life in prison.50 Some of the Chinese who were with him 
were sentenced to death.51  
The American government‘s response was preposterous. The 
United States said Downey and his colleague, Richard Fecteau, were 
civilian employees of the Department of the Army who had been lost 
on an authorized flight between Seoul and Tokyo.52 It was never 
explained how they managed to fall into Chinese hands. The U.S. 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, feigned outrage. He was 
totally loyal to Chiang Kai-Shek, supremely hypocritical, and 
determined to try to avoid any step that might implicitly grant 
legitimacy to the communist regime, even if such a step could secure 
the release of Downey and Fecteau. The United States protested 
Downey‘s and Fecteau‘s detention and conviction, which it branded 
as ―grossly contrary to the substance and spirit of all recognized 
international standards,‖ and based upon ―political charges . . . 
 
 47. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1, at 626. 
 48. Id. at 625–37, 640–41. 
 49. Id. at 628.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 634. 
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without foundation,‖ despite China‘s display of ample evidence of 
their espionage.53 The United States also claimed that the situation 
―furnishe[d] further proof of the Chinese Communist regime‘s 
disregard for accepted practices of international conduct.‖54 
If it hadn‘t been for Dulles, however, Downey and Fecteau could 
have been released by 1957. Dulles himself admitted this when he 
announced that although the PRC had indicated that it would release 
the prisoners if the United States would allow American newsmen to 
visit China, he would not approve such an arrangement because, he 
said, ―it would constitute yielding to Chinese ‗blackmail.‘‖55 Sadly, 
that was an offer that should never have been refused. We would 
have gotten our imprisoned CIA agents out of China and our 
newsmen into that little-known society, a perfect deal from a later 
American perspective. Beijing made this offer at a time when both its 
domestic and foreign policies were relatively relaxed, and it wanted 
to showcase its accomplishments in order to generate support among 
the American people.  
Within a few months, however, the olive branch was withdrawn. 
In mid-1957, China entered a more radical phase at home and abroad, 
one that culminated in the chaos of the Cultural Revolution‘s earliest 
years, 1966 to 1969, and resulted in the alienation of virtually every 
significant country in the world.56 In that period, China‘s practice of 
international law reached its nadir, especially with respect to 
violating the rights of foreigners and foreign diplomats in China.57 
 
 53. See id. at 629–30. 
 54. U.S. Protests Sentencing of Americans by Chinese Communists, 31 DEP‘T ST. BULL. 
856, 856 (1954). 
 55. See Daniel Aaron Rubin, Pawns of the Cold War: John Foster Dulles, the PRC, and 
the Imprisonments of John Downey and Richard Fecteau 57 (Aug. 16, 2004) (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Maryland, College Park) (on file with Digital Repository, 
University of Maryland, College Park). 
 56. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1, at 21. See also PETER VAN NESS, REVOLUTION AND 
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: PEKING‘S SUPPORT FOR WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION 202–03 
(1970) (explaining that the start of the Cultural Revolution brought a change in Chinese 
foreign policy, which included ―Maoist militance‖ that ―left in its wake chaos and violence 
and a trail of strained, broken, and battered foreign relationships‖); Victor D. Lippit, The 
Great Leap Forward, 1 Modern China 92, 93 (1975). 
 57. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1, at 21. The introduction of our book paints the picture:  
Amid the prevailing turmoil and xenophobia, diplomatic missions in Peking 
were targets of frequent demonstrations and occasional damage; diplomats, 
their staff, and their family members were sometimes mistreated by Red Guards 
and other popular elements, and a number of foreign nationals were jailed on 
charges ranging from espionage to disrespect for the image of Chairman Mao. 
Id. at 21. 
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Fortunately, public order began to be restored in the fall of 1969, 
and the PRC launched a campaign to regain international 
respectability and cultivate the support of other countries for a 
renewed effort to obtain the Chinese seat at the United Nations.58 It 
also undertook an intensive effort to normalize bilateral diplomatic 
relations with those Western countries that had not yet completed this 
process.59 It was not an easy task, since, in Beijing‘s eyes, that would 
require those countries to break diplomatic relations with the ROC on 
Taiwan and to recognize the PRC as the only legitimate government 
of China.60 Moreover, Beijing generally insisted that countries that 
wished to establish diplomatic relations with it had to acknowledge, 
to varying extents, that Taiwan should be deemed to be part of 
China.61 
Canada‘s normalization of relations with China in October 1970 
led the way and gave the PRC an important North American base, 
from which it could lobby for U.S. recognition.62 In their 
normalization agreement, the Canadians succeeded in persuading 
Beijing to pledge to carry on their relations ―in accordance with 
international practice.‖63 It was still too early in the PRC‘s political 
recovery for an explicit endorsement of ―international law.‖ 
The PRC‘s October 1971 replacement of Taiwan in the UN was 
the dramatic moment, of course, and would not have been possible if 
Beijing had not assured all and sundry, at least implicitly, that it 
would henceforth observe universal standards of international law 
and practice. Beijing wanted to finally get inside the big tent, and to 
do so it had to indicate that it would play by the rules. Other countries 
had decided that the only way to get China to play by the rules was to 
 
 58. Id. at 22. 
 59. See id. (regarding the United States). See also, Giovanni Bressi, China and Western 
Europe, 12 ASIAN SURVEY 819, 831 (1972) (―The aim was to break the nearly total isolation 
in which China had fallen in the previous two years, still without any substantial shift in 
strategy. It was therefore natural that Peking wanted to effect a come-back with the West-
European countries with whom its relations had been upset.‖). 
 60. See, e.g., BUSH, supra note 22, at 20 (discussing Beijing‘s position with respect to 
negotiations with the United States). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Chinese Embassy in Canada Marks National Day, 40 Years of Sino-Canadian 
Ties, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Oct. 1, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/ 
2010-10/01/c_13538826.htm (noting the October 13, 1970 reestablishment of diplomatic 
relations between China and Canada). 
 63. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1, at 241–42. See also Mitchell Sharp. Sec‘y of State for 
External Affairs, Speech Before the House of Commons About the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations Between Canada and China (Oct. 13, 1970), in 9 I.L.M. 1244. 
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finally admit it into the big tent. Thus, the PRC began the process of 
moderating its statements and its practices relating to international 
law, and trying not only to become a participant in, but also a shaper 
of, international law in various forums. The book that Hungdah and I 
did, People’s China and International Law, reviews the earliest years 
of this crucial history.64 To be sure, a big country with the PRC‘s 
radical tradition could not fundamentally change direction in a day, 
and, as the following story suggests, the difficulties encountered in 
the process should not be underestimated. 
On June 16, 1972, I had the good fortune to have dinner with 
Premier Zhou Enlai. I sat on his left and John Fairbank, the great 
historian of China, sat on his right. We were both from Harvard and 
had been members of a Harvard-MIT faculty group of China 
specialists who, immediately after Richard Nixon‘s 1968 election, 
had given the President-elect and his new assistant, our erstwhile 
colleague Henry Kissinger, a memorandum proposing steps towards 
a new American policy toward China. During our 1972 dinner with 
Zhou, we tried to persuade him to start the process of cultural 
exchange that we had recommended by permitting Chinese to go to 
Harvard. Zhou was interested, but he thought it was premature in the 
absence of formal diplomatic relations. He cleverly sparred with us 
on this and other topics. 
Finally, near the end of the dinner, I decided to go off on a 
different tack. I said to Zhou and to the group of Chinese officials 
around the table, including his deputy foreign minister, Qiao 
Guanhua, ―Now that you‘re in the United Nations, you should put 
somebody on the International Court of Justice.‖ They thought that 
was the funniest thing that anybody could ever suggest. They thought 
I was a comedian! What a ridiculous idea that the PRC would want to 
put someone on that bourgeois institution, the ICJ, where the Chinese 
representative would surely be outvoted and perhaps not even treated 
fairly. Their response reflected not only their Communist orientation, 
but also the distrust that many East Asians have felt toward Western-
dominated international tribunals since international law came to East 
Asia in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  
It took a decade, but in 1982 the PRC finally nominated a 
leading Chinese jurist for the ICJ.65 Since then, a succession of 
 
 64. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 1. 
 65. See The Court: All Members, INT‘L COURT OF JUSTICE (Feb. 28, 2012), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p3=2. 
4-COHEN MACRO (MJIL reviewed) (AUTHOR reviewed DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2012 10:10 AM 
24 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 27:9 
Chinese judges have done respected work on that court. However, the 
process of PRC participation in international adjudication is not 
complete. Like the United States, China has not accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, nor has it accepted participation 
in the relatively new International Criminal Court, although it has 
placed capable representatives on certain ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals. 
III. SOME CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES IN UNITED 
STATES–CHINA RELATIONS 
What are some of the contemporary international law problems 
that plague Sino-American relations? Many of the international law 
questions that first alienated the PRC from the United States in the 
period 1949 to 1950 endure today. We still haven‘t solved the 
problems that were created by the insertion of the
 
Seventh Fleet in the 
Taiwan Strait right after the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 
June 1950.66 We took the North Korean attack as a signal that 
―international communism‖ was beginning an Asian onslaught, not 
just in Korea, but also in the Taiwan Strait and Indo-China. U.S. 
intervention in the Taiwan Strait reversed the major national policy 
decision that had been announced by President Harry Truman and 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, less than six months earlier, that 
the United States would not interfere in the Chinese civil war.67 That 
January 1950 decision was based on the assumption that, although 
Taiwan‘s post-World War II status had not yet been formally 
determined by treaties, the island had been de facto returned to China 
from Japanese colonialism by the 1945 military arrangements in 
accordance with wartime commitments.68 
 
 66. See RICHARD C. THORNTON, CHINA: A POLITICAL HISTORY, 1917–1980, at 229 (1982) 
(―On June 27 [1950], two days after North Korean forces initiated their offensive, the United 
States decided to interpose the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland, thus 
preventing the Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan.‖). 
 67. See The President‘s News Conference of January 5, 1950, 1 PUB. PAPERS 11, 11 
(1950) (―The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to 
involvement in the civil conflict in China.‖). See also Dean Acheson, Crisis in Asia—An 
Examination of U.S. Policy, 22 DEP‘T ST. BULL. 111, 116 (1950) (reprinting a January 12, 
1950 speech before the National Press Club).  
 68. Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime 
Minister Churchill in North Africa, 9 DEP‘T ST. BULL. 393, 393 (1943) [hereinafter Cairo 
Declaration] (―[A]ll the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as Formosa 
[Taiwan] . . . shall be restored to the Republic of China.‖); Proclamation Defining Terms for 
Japanese Surrender, 13 DEP‘T ST. BULL. 137, 137 (1945) [hereinafter Potsdam Declaration] 
(―The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be 
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Of course, many Americans are very happy that the United 
States did interfere in the Taiwan Strait because that prevented a 
Communist takeover of the island and made possible the eventual 
development of democracy in Taiwan.69 The island‘s gradual 
progress from authoritarianism to democracy has refuted the oft-
heard claims from PRC leaders and many Mainlanders that Chinese 
are different from Westerners and do not share our views of 
democracy or human rights. Nevertheless, Beijing still remembers 
what Mr. Acheson said on January 12, 1950—that intervention in the 
Taiwan Strait would be seen not only by China‘s new leaders, but 
also by other countries of Asia, as interference in the territorial 
integrity of a great nation.70 To justify that intervention, in June 1950, 
the United States suddenly announced a new legal position—that the 
post-war legal status of Taiwan was still undetermined—substantially 
contradicting its earlier view.71 
 This was the dilemma that confronted President Nixon on his 
historic 1972 trip to China—how to deal with the legal status of 
Taiwan.72 Today we are still pondering the implications of the joint 
―Shanghai Communiqué‖ concluded between the United States and 
the PRC at that time and the joint communiqués that have followed, 
including that which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Washington and Beijing on January 1, 1979.73 Every time 
the United States sells arms to Taiwan in accordance with the duty to 
protect the island imposed by the Taiwan Relations Act, American 
domestic legislation, we confront the continuing question of 
 
limited . . . .‖); Instrument of Surrender, 13 DEP‘T ST. BULL. 364, 364 (1945) (documenting 
that the Emperor would be bound by the Potsdam Declaration). See also Y. Frank Chiang, 
One-China Policy and Taiwan, 28 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 1, 40–42 (2004) (arguing that the 
PRC‘s three theories of ownership over Taiwan are not valid under international law); Who 
Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 81 YALE L.J. 599, 634–39 (1972) (arguing 
that neither the Cairo Declaration nor the Potsdam Declaration were legal transfers of title 
to the ROC).  
 69. See THORNTON, supra note 66, at 229–30.  
 70. See Acheson, supra note 67, at 111–18.  
 71. Cohen, supra note 44 at 113; TANG TSOU, supra note 25, at 534–36.  
 72. See generally Jerome Alan Cohen, Recognizing China, 50 FOREIGN AFF. 30 (1971); 
Tucker, supra note 21. 
 73. See Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People‘s Republic of 
China, 1 PUB. PAPERS 376 (Feb. 27, 1972) [hereinafter Shanghai Connuniqué]. See also, 
Toasts of the President and Chairman Chang Ch‘un-ch‘iao at a banquet in Shanghai, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 379 (Feb. 27, 1972). See also, Hsieh, supra note 28, at 774 (―[O]n January 1, 1979, 
President Jimmy Carter formally announced the decision to terminate relations with the ROC 
and to recognize the PRC as "the sole legal government of China").  
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Taiwan‘s status in international law.74 This is because the United 
States, for the past thirty-three years, has recognized the PRC as the 
only legitimate government of China, does not maintain formal 
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, and, 
beginning with the Shanghai Communiqué, has not challenged in 
principle that Taiwan is part of China.75 Nevertheless, we continue 
the arms sales over Beijing‘s protests.76 These long-standing 
problems of international and domestic law and politics are not likely 
to be resolved in the near future. 
It is sometimes said that despite the PRC‘s increasingly 
sophisticated theory and practice of international law since its entry 
into the United Nations four decades ago, it still advocates a
 
nineteenth-century view of the state as having untrammeled 
sovereignty.77 Yet that is too broad a generalization. The PRC has 
been understandably sensitive about having its freedom of action 
limited by modern rules and interpretations to which it has not agreed 
to be bound. Yet, as I mentioned earlier, in the exercise of its 
sovereignty the PRC has frequently committed itself to obligations in 
the international community, whether one considers the United 
Nations, the World Trade Organization or many human rights and 
other multilateral documents that inevitably constrain the exercise of 
its sovereignty, and it has proved to be an able player in the parry and 
thrust of the application of international law in many contexts.78  
Recently, however, doubts have arisen. Since the Communist 
Party‘s Seventeenth National Congress in the fall of 2007, we have 
occasionally heard a more radical tone suggesting a rising China‘s 
potential contempt for the world community. This has occasionally 
led to an extreme invocation of sovereignty. 
 
 74. See Hungdah Chiu, supra note 27 at 345–46 (explaining the Taiwan Relations Act as 
―necessary to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific . . . .‖). 
 75. For the text of the Shanghai Communique, see Shanghai Communique, supra note 
73. 
 76. See, e.g., John Pomfret, U.S. sells arms to Taiwanese; China Warns of Reprisals, 
Beijing 'Strongly Indignant' About Sales, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2010, at A8 (reporting on 
sale of ―$6 billion worth of patriot anti-missile systems, helicopters, mine-sweeping ships 
and communications equipment to Taiwan in a long-expected move that sparked an angry 
protest from China.‖).  
 77. See, e.g., Ann Kent, China’s International Socialization: The Role of International 
Organizations, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 343, 346 (2002) (stating that China has an absolute 
and formal view of sovereignty). 
 78. See, e.g., id. at 344–45 (explaining that ―the importance of international 
organizations in China‘s foreign relations cannot be overestimated,‖ that China is an active 
participant in international law, and that through that participation, the country conducts 
―lively and astute promotion of its national interests‖). 
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I‘ll cite just a couple of examples. The most obvious concerns 
the South China Sea. Although the PRC‘s vague but disturbingly 
expansive claim to most of the South China Sea derives from the 
1947 so-called ―eleven-dotted line‖ that the Republic of China drew 
before Communism ousted it from nationwide power, it is Beijing‘s 
recent re-assertions of that claim, with slight modification as the 
―nine-dotted line‖ but without clarification or persuasive justification, 
that have come to worry other countries, and not only its immediate 
neighbors.79 This concern is over sea boundaries and broad territorial 
claims to the many islands, islets, reefs and other features that affect 
those boundaries.80 It is also over the question whether other states, 
without China‘s permission, have the authority under international 
law to conduct military reconnaissance and marine mapping in the 
exclusive economic zones claimed by China.81 This is an issue of 
great importance to the United States. The conference that created the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea appears to 
have authorized such activities, over the objection of a small group of 
countries, without any objection from China at that time.82 Since 
then, however, the PRC has staunchly opposed both American aerial 
 
 79. See Li Jinming & Li Dexia, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China 
Sea: A Note, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT‘L L. 287, 287–90 (2003) (explaining the history of the 
―eleven-dotted line,‖ later known as the ―nine-dotted line‖ and ―U-shaped line‖). See also 
James Kraska, I.O. 2.0: Indian Ocean Security and the Law of the Sea, 43 GEORGETOWN J. 
INT‘L L. 433, 459 (2012) (―Increasing Chinese persistence in advocating special rights based 
on its now (in)famous [eleven-dotted line] has alienated the entire region.‖). 
 80. See, e.g., John Pomfret, China Renews Claim to South China Sea, Vows Freedom of 
Passage, WASH. POST, July 31, 2010, at A7 (explaining that there was a ―push‖ by the 
United States, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries to challenge China‘s claims to 
much of the sea). 
 81. The concept of exclusive economic zones came from the Latin American countries in 
the 1950s, and is now in the Convention on the Law of the Sea. See Zou Keyuan, Chinese 
Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and its Legal Consequences for 
the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands, 14 INT‘L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 27, 
44 (1999). Article 55 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea states that every ―coastal state 
is entitled to have an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles measured from coastal 
baselines.‖ Id. China ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996, and declared 
certain exclusive economic zones. Id. In 1998 China passed the Law on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. Id. The extent to which China is entitled to claim 
exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea and other seas is a very complex question 
the answer to which will depend on a number of factors yet to be determined through 
negotiations among conflicting claimants. For analysis of the extent to which China can 
legitimately bar military reconnaissance and sea bottom mapping by other states within its 
exclusive economic zones, see for example Jonathan G. Odom, The True ―Lies‖ of the 
Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why 
Every Nation (Outisde of China) Should Be Concerned, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 411 (2010); 
Margaret K. Lewis, Note, An Analysis of State Responsibility for the Chinese-American 
Airplane Collision Incident, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1404 (2002). 
 82. See Odom, supra note 81, at 439–42.  
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and naval reconnaissance, as well as mapping of the sea bottom, in its 
EEZ, and this has led to at least two very serious military, diplomatic 
incidents.83 China has also resisted American efforts to negotiate 
agreed bilateral rules to avoid such incidents and to deal with them if 
they should occur, apparently believing that to do so might constitute 
recognition of the legitimacy of the American activities.84 
Less obvious has been China‘s exercise of what it calls its 
―judicial sovereignty.‖ Concerns on this score go back to the Western 
powers‘ nineteenth century imposition of ―extraterritoriality‖ on 
China, according to which Chinese courts lost jurisdiction over cases 
involving nationals of many Western countries in the ―treaty ports‖ 
that Western governments came to dominate, and regarding certain 
important activities elsewhere in the country.85 As a result of the 
Opium War and the series of ―unequal treaties‖ that it introduced, 
extraterritoriality became a hated incubus for rising Chinese 
nationalism and fueled a demand for terminating the judicial 
restrictions and inequality that symbolized China‘s inferior 
international status.86 The United States only ended its extraterritorial 
rights in China in 1943, in response to the needs of its World War II 
alliance with Chiang Kai-shek‘s government.87 
After establishment of the People‘s Republic, the propaganda of 
Chairman Mao‘s government, in seeking to unify the nation, made 
the most of what came to be known as China‘s ―century of 
humiliation.‖88 The PRC proudly trumpeted its claim to have restored 
the nation‘s sovereignty by allowing no exceptions to the exercise of 
its judicial power except for those that the government has freely 
granted in accordance with its acceptance of international practice 
and treaties. This has appropriately placed China in an international 
position equal to that of all other respected nations. 
 
 83. See id. at 414–16 (describing the 2009 incident in which Chinese ships surrounded 
the USNS Impeccable while it was conducting what the United States perceived to be 
routine operations in international waters); Lewis, supra note 81, at 1408–10 (describing the 
April 1, 2011 incident in which a U.S. surveillance plane and a Chinese jet fighter crashed).  
 84. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 81, at 1437–41 (recommending a specific bilateral 
agreement for use when Chinese and U.S. military forces encounter one another).  
 85. See Wang Ke-wen, Extraterritoriality, in MODERN CHINA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
HISTORY, CULTURE, AND NATIONALISM, supra note 27, at 126. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Alison A. Kaufman, China Analyst, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Econ. and 
Sec. Review Comm‘n Hearing on ―China‘s Narratives Regarding National Security Policy‖ 
2 (Mar. 10, 2011). 
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Recently, however, the PRC has occasionally invoked judicial 
sovereignty in a way that suggests it may be seeking more than an 
equal position in the world. Recall, for example, the dispute between 
Australia and China over the Rio Tinto case, where Mr. Stern Hu, an 
Australian national originally from China, and three of his Chinese 
colleagues were prosecuted.89 One of the charges, commercial 
espionage, was said to involve ―state secrets,‖ and the Shanghai court 
handling the case declared part of the trial to be closed to the public.90 
The Australian government was understandably disturbed that its 
consular officials were also denied the right to attend the secret part 
of the trial, but it failed to support its protest with available legal 
argumentation.91 
The consular agreement between Australia and China for the 
protection of each party‘s nationals, like many Chinese bilateral 
consular agreements, seemed to call for the admission to any trial of 
consuls from the country of the person prosecuted, whether the trial 
was deemed to be open or closed.92 There was no exception in the 
agreement.93 
Drawing on some general language in the agreement, China 
might have argued that, if properly understood, the agreement should 
be interpreted to contain an implicit exception for trials involving 
state secrets in accordance with Chinese law. That would have been a 
standard type of international law argument, even though it would 
have been a weak one in the circumstances. But when the Australian 
government protested, the Chinese government did not make a 
conventional international law response with respect to the 
 
 89. See, e.g., Jerome A. Cohen & Yu-Jie Chen, Op-Ed., Law Unto Itself, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Apr. 1, 2010, at 11 (analyzing the Rio Tinto case). 
 90. See David Barboza, Rio Tinto Trial Gets Bribe Evidence, Closed Nature of Session 
in Shanghai Leaves Questions Unanswered, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 24, 2010, at 14 
(―Australia had pressed to have its officials attend the commercial secrets part of the trial, 
and legal experts have sharply criticized China for barring even an Australian consular 
official from attending that portion.‖). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Agreement on Consular Relations Between the People‘s Republic of China and 
Australia, China-Austl., art. 11, ¶ 1(f), Sept. 8, 1999, http://www.legislation.gov.hk/ 
bilateral/caaustralia_e.pdf (―[I]n the case of a trial . . . against a national of the sending State 
in the receiving State, the appropriate authorities shall make available to the consular post 
information on the charges against that national. A consular officer shall be permitted to 
attend the trial or other legal proceedings.‖).  
 93. See Frank Ching, Why is China Ignoring its Treaty Obligations?, BUS. TIMES 
SINGAPORE, Mar. 31, 2010 (―[T]he fact that the Chinese closed part of the trial despite the 
clear terms of a bilateral agreement is worrisome and casts doubt on the value of China's 
signature on any treaty or international accord.‖). 
4-COHEN MACRO (MJIL reviewed) (AUTHOR reviewed DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2012 10:10 AM 
30 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 27:9 
agreement. Instead, its Foreign Ministry spokesman airily dismissed 
the agreement and simply announced that nothing can interfere with 
China‘s judicial sovereignty.94  
What a nonsensical and dangerous position! China, in the 
exercise of its sovereignty, had freely committed itself to this treaty. 
Yet, the Foreign Ministry spokesman told the world that even treaties 
voluntarily concluded by the PRC cannot interfere with its 
sovereignty, especially judicial sovereignty.95 To make matters 
worse, there was an internal Chinese regulation, apparently not 
discovered by Australia or mentioned by China, stating that, in cases 
where a consular agreement provides for consular access to trials, 
that provision should be implemented even if the trial is deemed to be 
secret.96 So Chinese domestic law as well as the consular agreement‘s 
literal text supported the Australian position, even though the Chinese 
spokesman implied the contrary.97  
That is not very comforting for those of us who want to see the 
PRC play by the rules of the game. Without any public explanation, 
the PRC took the same position with respect to the secret trial of an 
American national of Chinese origin, Mr. Xue Feng.98 Like the 
Australians, the U.S. government, apparently because of a lack of 
legal expertise in the relevant department of the American Embassy, 
failed to mount an informed protest.99 
Even more troublesome is the number of Chinese who have been 
locked up by their own government without any legal authority and 
held, for varying periods and in various places, in complete violation 
 
 94. Id. (quoting the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang: ―the China-
Australia Consular Agreement should work on the premise of respect to China's sovereignty 
and judicial sovereignty. China's judicial authorities decide how to handle the case in light of 
Chinese laws and the nature of the case, and we should respect their decision.‖). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (―Article 6(a) of the [Regulations on Handling of Certain Problems in Foreign 
Related Cases] provides that if China has signed agreements expressly permitting consular 
[attendance at trials], then foreign consular attendance must be permitted even in closed 
trials.‖). See also Cohen & Yu-Jie Chen, supra note 89. 
 97. See Rio Tinto Case Should Not Be Politicized, Beijing Says, PEOPLE‘S DAILY ONLINE, 
Mar. 19, 2010, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/6924731.html. 
 98. See Jerome A. Cohen, Op-Ed., Justice Denied, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 21, 
2010); Jerome A. Cohen, Op-Ed., Legal Pitfalls, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 2, 2011); 
Jerome A. Cohen, Op-Ed., Out in the Open, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 26, 2009); 
Andrew Jacobs, Beijing Upholds U.S. Citizen’s Sentence, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 19, 
2011, at 8. 
 99. See Jacobs, supra note 98. (―The U.S. Embassy was banned from the courtroom 
despite a Sino-American agreement that guarantees defendants consular representation.‖). 
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of both domestic and international law.100 The PRC adheres to over 
twenty international human rights documents. Although it has signed 
but not yet ratified the most important one, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,101 it has often violated the 
provisions of some of the human rights treaties to which it has long 
adhered, such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.102 In some cases, 
such as that of the repeatedly tortured and ―disappeared‖ human 
rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, Foreign Ministry spokesmen have made 
their government look ridiculous by issuing a series of ludicrous 
explanations for what amounted to official kidnapping.103 
So these are seeds of doubt, you might say, about how 
consistently the PRC is prepared to play by the rules of the 
international system, rules that it has chosen to adopt through 
adherence to multilateral treaties, such as the Anti-Torture 
Convention, and bilateral treaties, such as consular agreements. 
Interestingly, when I wrote an op-ed about the Rio Tinto case, 
criticizing the Foreign Ministry for its treatment of the Australian 
consular agreement, I thought that Foreign Ministry officials might 
respond.104 Yet they remained silent, perhaps because they knew it 
wouldn‘t pass muster in the world community. 
On the other hand, we do see many examples of continuing 
Chinese pragmatism regarding a rules-based system, even when it 
comes to dealing with its ―core interest‖ in regaining Taiwan. Of 
course, although the PRC would never characterize cross-strait 
 
 100. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ―AN ALLEYWAY IN HELL‖: CHINA‘S ABUSIVE ―BLACK 
JAILS‖ 12–16 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
china1109webwcover_1.pdf; Jerome A. Cohen & Eva Pils, The Fate of China’s Rights 
Lawyers, FAR E. ECON. REV. (Dec. 2009), http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/december51/ 
cohenpils; Jerome A. Cohen, Op-Ed., China’s Jailed Champions, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
July 26, 2008, at 15. 
 101. But see China Amends Laws for Ratification of Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Report, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., July 14, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
english2010/china/2011-07/14/c_13984867.htm. 
 102. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
 103. Jerome A. Cohen & Beth Schwanke, Op-Ed., China’s Missing Human Rights 
Lawyer, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 19, 2010, at 8. Responding to repeated UN demands to 
report Mr. Gao‘s precise location, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman replied: ―You 
can‘t expect MoFA‘s spokesman to know where everyone is. China has 1.3 billion people, 
there‘s no way I can know where everyone is.‖ Id. See also Jerome A. Cohen & Jared 
Genser, Op-Ed., Harmful Effects, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2012, at 11.  
 104. Jerome A. Cohen & Yu-Jie Chen, Op-Ed., Law Unto Itself, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Apr. 1, 2010, at 11. 
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relations as ―international,‖ the many ―semi-official‖ agreements that 
have been made between Mainland and Taiwan organizations in the 
last few years illustrate the Chinese preference for practical 
arrangements over nationalistic rhetoric. Beijing and equally 
pragmatic counterparts in Taipei have found a way to successfully 
negotiate some sixteen agreements on an equal footing, despite the 
PRC‘s insistence that as a formal matter, the ―authorities in Taiwan‖ 
merely represent a provincial Chinese government, rather than the 
PRC‘s sovereign equal, the Republic of China on Taiwan. Professor 
Chiu‘s former protégé, President Ma Ying-jeou, has to be given 
enormous credit for this impressive political–legal feat. 
I remember seeing both sides of this contemporary Chinese 
political personality, alternately nationalistic and practical, on my 
first visit to China in 1972. On about the fourth day, after we had 
come to know each other, I felt I could have a serious chat with my 
very intelligent escort from the Academy of Sciences. We were 
sightseeing at the Ming tombs outside Beijing, on a hillside looking 
down on the gorgeous valley, and I raised the question of the already 
bitter dispute between Japan and China over the strategically-located 
eight piles of rock called the Senkaku islands in Japanese, and 
Diaoyutai in China. I was living in Japan at the time and had just 
given a lecture to the Harvard Club of Japan about this dispute, which 
had aroused dangerous nationalistic passions in Japan, as well as in 
China and Taiwan. I thought I knew my new Chinese friend well 
enough to ask him what he thought about the Diaoyutai problem.  
He immediately launched into a highly emotional tirade: ―China 
will never allow the Japanese aggressors to occupy one inch of its 
sacred soil! We will fight them to the death!‖ He got very excited, 
and I was getting upset because I had upset him. Yet, somewhat 
mischievously, I said, ―I‘m very sorry about this, but I should tell you 
that last week (May 15, 1972) the U.S. government transferred 
administrative control over those islands to Japan.‖ Again, he 
suddenly changed completely. With a relaxed smile, he said, ―Look, 
one has to be practical. We don‘t have to solve this problem today. 
Any time in the next 500 years will do.‖  
In very short compass, I saw these two opposing aspects, and 
that‘s what the struggle is going to be about. Which will prevail—the 
ardent nationalism that so many members of the younger generation 
in China evince on the internet and social media, or the traditional 
Chinese practical spirit?  
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I take hope from some of the good examples we have seen lately. 
Canada and China recently made an agreement to send back to China 
supposedly the biggest smuggler in Chinese history, Lai 
Changxing.105 In order to get him back, the Chinese government 
made a number of concessions about how it would treat him.106 Lai is 
not a Canadian national, but a Chinese.107 While I believe that 
China‘s concessions were inadequate to protect him, they 
nevertheless constitute an important precedent showing the world that 
China can be practical, because it wants to bring back to China all of 
its allegedly corrupt nationals who have in total absconded with the 
equivalent of many billions of dollars. 
Another type of pragmatic development, less well known, is that 
American government food and drug inspectors are now operating in 
China.108 The FBI also has an office in Beijing.109 These things 
would not have been feasible before. They are a reflection of 
increasing globalization and, specifically, China‘s needs, 
respectively, to assure the continuing success of its exports to the 
United States and to help punish notorious economic offenders who 
plague Sino-American relations. A lot of useful, practical things are 
happening. 
Of course, China had to make a number of concessions to secure 
its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).110 Prime 
 
 105. See Jerome A. Cohen, In Safe Hands?, Op-Ed., S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug 3, 
2011, at 17.  
 106. Id.  
 107. See Miro Cernetig, For Chretien, a Catch-22; If Lai is Deported, He Could Be 
Executed, But His Presence in Canada Will Rile China, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Nov. 30, 
2000, at A7. 
 108. See Andrew Jacobs & Mark McDonald, U.S. Food Inspectors Open Beijing Office, 
INT‘L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 20, 2008 at 4. 
 109. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Threats and Responses: The F.B.I.; Ashcroft Says U.S. Will 
Place Agents in China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002, at A15. 
 110. A recent article summarizes the concessions: 
In the end, China had to make a more comprehensive set of initial commitments 
than those offered by many developed countries during the Uruguay Round. 
Not only did China have to sacrifice its principle of acceding unqualifiedly as a 
developing country, but it also accepted conditions that, in many ways, 
substantially exceeded those of other developing—and even developed—
countries. Most notable was China‘s agreement to be treated as a ―non-market‖ 
economy under certain conditions by other WTO members. The so-called 
China-specific commitments (that is, accession terms that apply to China alone) 
are unprecedented in the history of the WTO and are unparalleled by those 
undertaken by any other acceding WTO member.  
Xiaohui Wu, No Longer Outside, Not Yet Equal: Rethinking China’s Membership in the 
World Trade Organization, 10 CHINESE J. INT‘L L. 2 27, 239 (2011) (footnote omitted).  
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Minister Zhu Rongji knew that for China‘s economic development 
and cooperation with the world, WTO entry was critical. Zhu was 
practical and powerful enough to persuade, indeed pressure, the 
country‘s conservative leaders and government agencies and 
enterprises into making necessary concessions, despite their vested 
interests. The fruits of his dynamic farsightedness are increasingly 
apparent. Some day, one or more comparable figures in the Party 
politburo may have the vision, power, and determination to take the 
risks of sparking significant political–legal reforms, especially 
concerning China‘s civil and political rights, the way Zhu Rongji 
fostered China‘s economic modernization. 
Today, unlike 1960, when I had my first Chinese lesson, or 
1972, when I first visited China, there is, on balance, a substantial 
basis for optimism about China‘s attitude towards the world 
community and international law. In 1971, when the PRC assumed 
China‘s seat in the United Nations, it was so short of relevant talent 
that UN Ambassador Huang Hua‘s wife, whose field was economics 
rather than law, was asked to represent China on the United Nations‘ 
Sixth or Legal Committee. Since then, the Chinese Government has 
assembled an impressive array of international law experts, and many 
Chinese specialists in this field now serve in international 
organizations as well as in academic and research institutions. 
Chinese law professors and other experts appear to be increasingly 
influential with their government, and their impact is usually salutary. 
I think that a ―rising China‖ can be peacefully accommodated in 
the international community and that international law is destined to 
play an important role in bringing this about. Yet, we must remember 
that the challenge is not only China‘s, but also our own. As I have 
already illustrated, the history of Sino-Western relations is replete 
with examples of Western hypocrisy in the manipulation of 
international law.111 We cannot expect China to take international law 
more seriously than other major states do. The PRC‘s perceptions of 
how others play the game will continue to be crucial to its own 
conduct. Greater fidelity to international law on the part of the United 
States and other countries, in practice as well as rhetoric, will be 
essential to stimulating China‘s further progress in this respect.  
I hope that many of us here will continue the valuable work that 
Professor Chiu Hungdah has done concerning China, Taiwan and 
 
 111. See supra Part II. 
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international law. That will be the most fitting tribute we can pay to 
his memory. 
 
